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IIi 1~I-IE SUPREblE COUR1~ 
of the 
s·rATE OF UTAH 
\X!EBER BASIN WATER CONSERV-
ANCY DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
, Case No. 
9256 
]. G[RT NELSON AND MYRTLE G. 
NELSON, et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant's statement of facts should be supplemented 
to point out that contrary to the itnpression given by the 
appellants' brief, only a small part of the 10.3 acres of land 
condemned was good pasture land, and the farm was not 
suited for a dairy operation at the time the action was filed. 
Certain important details regarding appraised values and the 
appellants' motion for judgment are also added. 
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There is a duplication of paging in the record. References 
to the transcript are designated ('fr. ) , and to the pleadings 
and other papers in the file are designated (R. ) . 
The readers of the appellants' brief may get the idea 
that the plaintiff was taking the heart out of a good dairy 
farm. On page 4 it says, Clthe land taken includes all of the 
natural pasture on appellants' farm." It is stated on page 5 
that, Clprior to the enlargement of the reservoir, appellants 
maintained a herd of 25 milking cows and 20 dry stock." As 
a matter of fact n1ost of the land taken was steep hillside. 
The appellants' expert, Mr. Story, said that of the 10.3 
acres of land, 2 acres were crop land on top of the bench, and 
one acre was ub-irrigated pasture. The remainder was nrolling 
hillside'' with quaking aspen, choke cherry, grass, and a little 
sage brush (Tr. 70-72). Mr. Kiepe said the land consisted of 
three types, ( 1) land which had been under cultivation, (2) 
''steep drop-off type of land,'' and ( 3) good pasture ( T r. 131) . 
He said that there were 2.8 acres of cultivated land and the 
rest he put in one class for purposes of valuation and de-
scribed it as Clsteep hillside and irregular grazing land, and 
then those pockets where there was some sub-irrigated land'' 
(Tr. 132-133). 
The sub-irrigated pasture was estimated at 1 acre by Mr. 
Story, (Tr. 72) and at 1Vz to 2 acres by Mr. Warnick. The 
good pasture with a high carrying capacity formerly used by 
the appellants, \vas leased land which was not involved in 
the suit. The lease expired in 1954, before the suit was filed. 
See Exhibit F. It consisted of a Clbuffe.r area," (the land above 
the original high water line of Pineview Reservoir and below 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the area taken in this suit), and land in the bed of the original 
Pinevie\\' Reservoir. Mr. Warnick estimated the carrying 
capacity of the leased land at 12-15 cows (Tr. 170) and the 
carrying capacity of the 10.3 acres (excluding the 2 acres of 
cultivated land) at 2 to 3 cows (Tr. 171-172). The topographic 
map, plaintiffs Exhibit C, shows the steepness of the land 
taken (area in red) and the locations of the good feed. 
Mr. Kiepe described the farm as not suited for a dairy 
operation before the taking. We quote: 
A. Well, it was quite apparent to me, after talking 
to the o\\rners, that they were making a very hard 
st.:uggle out of trying to make a dairy farm out of the 
property which could no longer be very satisfactorily 
operated, particular! y at the conclusion of the lease, 
the 20-year lease in~ 7olving 76 acres down in the bot-
tom. The struggle they had had to provide feed, green 
feed, it was obvious because they were feeding hay the 
year around, they were not turning the cattle back out 
at night in order to take advantage of green feed, they 
had leased out the ground and still hadn't been able 
to n1ake it. They had taken about ten acres of their 
top bench land to n1ake a pasture which cut short their 
feed in the matter of grain and hay and it was very 
obvious to me that this property, after their lease ended, 
they didn't lose it because it ~7as at the end of their 
contract, after that contrac was ended, that this prop-
erty should no longer be considered as a suitable dairy 
operation. That was the end of it. So consequently, in 
my opinion, the dairy barns and the milk house and 
so forth were worthless except for a very nominal 
amount to this property or to a new purchaser. They 
\YOuld have a very nominal value because of the fact 
that it v:as not suitable as a dairy operation. 
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Q. Now, you are saying it was not suited as a dairy 
operation as of March 25, 1957? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And after the terminaton of the lease? 
A. Well, it was my opinion when I made the in-
spection in 1955, but this is my opinion as of these 
figures are as of March 1957. 
Q. But you reached your conclusion with respect to 
its not being a good dairy unit as of 195 5 when you 
were on the property examining it? 
A. I did. (Tr. 138, 139). 
The appellants and respondent each had expert testimony 
as to just compensation. 'fhe following is a tabulation of their 
testimony: 
Werner Kiepe 
Land ------------------------------------------------------------------$3,040.00 
Severance ---------------------------------------------------------- 5 00.00 
Charles Story 
$3,540.00 
(Tr. 132, 133, 140) 
Land ----------------------------------------------------------------$ 3, 862. 50 
Severance on remaining land ------------------------ 6,900.00 
Severance on buildings ---------------------------------- 10,745.40 
Total ---------------------------------------··------------------------$21, 507.90 
(Tr. 55, 62-67) 
The jury verdict was $4,897 .00. But the difference in the 
"before" and "after" values appearing in the answers to 
special interrogatories was $5,396.90. There was obviously a 
conflict between the general verdict and the answers to the 
special interrogatories. 
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After the verdict was rendered, but before judgment the 
defendants filed the following document: 
Motion for Entry of Judgment or For New Trial 
Come no\v the above-named defendants, appearing 
by and through their attorney of record, Glen E. Fuller, 
and hereby move the court to enter judgment in the 
above-entitled action in accordance with the general 
verdict and the answers to special interrogatories sub-
mitted to the jury in said action in a manner consistent 
in amount \Vith the evidence and the answers to the 
special interrogatories; or in the alternative, that the 
court order a nevv trial to be had. This motion is made 
pursuant to Rule 49 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure? and is based upon the apparent fact that no 
judgtnent has been entered in said matter to this time. 
It is requested that the clerk of the above-entitled 
court set the above motion for hearing before the 
Honorable John F. Wahlquist, District Judge, at 11:00 
A.M. on Monday, May 18, 1959. 
Dated this 30th day of April, 1959. 
Glen E. Fuller 
Glen E. Fuller 
Attorney for Defendants 
(R. 76) 
After argument the trial court made a memorandum 
decision as follows: 
The briefs submitted herein, together with my recall 
of the trial, have been considered. I apologize to the 
parties for the delay. I believed that I had disposed of 
the n:a.tter last June until receipt of Mr. Fuller's letter 
of 30 October 1959. 
Judgment is to be entered for $5,397.00. It is my 
belief that the apparent incorrectness in the verdict 
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• 
and the interrogatory is in reality a mathematical error 
of 500 units (dollars; of course 90c is rounded off to 
one dollar.) 
$51,600.00 
46,203.10 
$ 5,396.90 
I do not believe it necessarily follows, or even rea-
sonably follov1s, that the jury reached these figures in 
the way suggested by Mr. Fuller. There is a lot of give 
and take in a jury room. Discussions there stop at some 
figure and one may be accepted as just, by a juror even 
though his view is not identical to that of the witness 
who first suggested the figure. The verdict in this case 
is fairly within the evidence. 
I assume the jury attempted to follow my instructions 
or the formula for fixing damages and erred in their 
mathematics. 
Dated this 13th day of November 1959. 
John F. Wahlquist 
Judge 
(R. 79) 
Judgment was entered for $5,397.00. The defendants 
thereafter filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The judgment was properly entered under Ru1e 49 (b). 
2. The appellants' motion for judgment based on the 
answers to special interrogatories was granted and the appel-
lants are estopped fron1 questioning the judgment on this 
appeal. 
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3. The trial court did not err in admitting witness War-
nick's testimony. 
4. The trial court did not err in giving instruction No. 12. 
ARGUMENT 
THE JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY ENTERED UNDER 
RULE 49 (b). 
This is a typical case for the application of Rule 49 (b) 
of the Rules of Civil Procedure. There is a conflict between 
the general verdict in the amount of $4,897.00 and the answers 
to the special interrogatories, which by subtraction would 
make the verdict $5,396.90. By the plain language of the rule 
the trial court had authority to direct the entry of judgment 
in accordance \Vith the answers. The following part of the 
rule obviously applies. 
\(When the answers are consistent with each other 
but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, 
the court may direct the entry of judgment in accord-
ance with the answers, notwithstanding the general 
verdict, or may return the jury for further consideration 
of its answers and verdict or may order a new trial." 
The appellants rely on the following sentence in the rule: 
( (\Vhen the answers are inconsistent with each other 
and one or more is like,vise inconsistent with the general 
verdict, the court shall not direct the entry of judgment 
but may return the jury for further consideration of 
its answers and verdict or may order a new trial." 
This last quoted sentence is not applicable because the 
ans\vers to the interrogatories are not ((inconsistent with each 
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other." There is nothing inconsistent between the answer that 
the value before taking was $51,600.00, and the answer that 
the value after taking was $46,203.10. The appellants assert 
over and over again that the answers are inconsistent with each 
other but fail to po1nt out the inconsistency. 
The appellants attempt to inject into the problem an 
analysis of the evidence and speculation as to why the jury 
arrived at $51,600.00 and $46,203.10. Such analysis and 
speculation are entirely out of order where, as here, the verdict 
and judgment is supported by competent evidence. Weber 
Basin Water Conservancy District v. Skeen, (Utah), 328 
P.2d. 730. See also the case of Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea 
Co., 5 Utah 2d 587, 299 P 2d. 622, where the rule is stated 
as follows: 
((This case having been tried to a jury, they were the 
exclusive judges of the evidence and of the inferences 
to be drawn therefrom. It was not the privilege of the 
court to disagree with and overrule their action unless 
the evidence so unerringly pointed to a contrary con-
clusion that there existed no reasonable basis for the 
jury's finding. This court has many times affirmed 
commitment to a policy of reluctance to interfere with 
findings of fact and verdicts rendered by juries, and 
has declared that it should be done only when the 
matter is so clear as to be free from doubt." 
To the same effect see Jensen v. Denver and R. W. R. 
Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 P. 1185; Heywood v. Denver and R. 
W. R. Co., 6 Utah 2d. 155, 307 P.2d 1045. 
The jury's ans\vers to interrogatories must be accepted by 
the appellate court where it cannot say fron1 reading the record 
that the answers are untrue. 
10 
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Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Relias, 99 Ind. App. 115, 185 
N.E. 319. 
The appellate court has not the power or insight to analyze 
and speculate on the processes by which the jury arrived at their 
conclusions. 
Hanna v. Central States Electric Co., 
210 Iowa 864, 232 N. W. 421 
City Transportation Co. v. V atsures, 
278 S.W. 2d 373. 
The answers to the special interrogatories are consistent 
\vith each other and the trial court, pursuant to Rule 49 (b) 
properly entered the judgment based on the answers. 
THE APPELLANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM QUES-
TIONING THE JUDGMENT. 
The appellants filed the motion, quoted in full above, 
for the entry of judgment or for new trial. It is difficult to 
determine from a reading of the document just what the 
appellants sought as to .the amount of the judgment to be 
entered. However, it appears from the following, 
<(Come now the above-named defendants - and 
hereby move the court to enter judgment-in accord-
ance with the general verdict and the answers to the 
special interrogatories submitted to the jury in said 
action, in a manner consistent in amount with the evi-
dence and the special interrogatories-." (Emphasis 
added.) 
~- that appellants by the motion sought to have the court enter 
judgment for at least the amount of $5,396.10, which is the 
11 
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difference between the value of the farm, before and after 
the taking, as reflected by the answers to the special inter-
rogatories. The court entered the judgment for the increased 
amount. Although at the time of the argument of the motion, 
counsel for the appellants asserted that the judgment should 
have been $8,000.00 based on his speculative analysis of the 
evidence, the court increased the award only about $500.00. 
Nevertheless the increase was the court's ruling on the motion. 
See the court's memorandum decision above. 
The following general rule is applicable: 
((Since a party may appeal only from an involuntary 
adverse judgment, it is a well settled general rule de-
clared in some states by express statutory provision, 
that a party 1s not aggrieved by a judgment, order, 
decree or ruling regularly rendered or made, on agree-
ment or otherwise, with his express or implied con-
sent, and therefore he cannot appeal or sue out a writ 
of error to review it . . . Under this general rule, a 
party generally is estopped or waives right to appeal 
or bring error where a judgment, order or decree was 
entered on his motion ... " 4 C.J.S. see 213, pp. 629-
631. (Emphasis added.) 
The appellants cannot now question the judgment entered 
on their motion. 
WITNESS WARNICK'S TESTIMONY WAS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED. 
The appellants contend that Mr. Warnick was not qualified 
to testify as to the carrying capacity of the land taken for the 
grazing of cattle. 
12 
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Mr. Warnick testified that he was raised on a farm in 
Millard County and remained on the farm until he was 22 
years old; that it was an all-purpose farm. He said: 
''We had about 10 to 15 dairy cows and a small 
flock of sheep and a few beef animals and a number 
of horses." (Tr. 166). 
In addition to his experience on the farm Mr. Warnick 
is a civil engineer with many years experience in planning 
irrigation developments and in making studies of farm lands. 
Q. Now, Mr. Warnick, have you had other experi-
ence since you becatne a civil engineer with respect to 
analysis of farms and carrying capacities and so on? 
A. Yes, sir; I've been in the planning of irrigation 
developments since 1942 in various locations through-
out Colorado and Utah and have been responsible for 
economic analysis of farm developments, what they 
can produce and an economy of work connected with 
them. I have done work in Kamas and Heber Valley~ 
Utah and Weber Basin, Utah and Gunnison, Colorado 
area in Colorado. (Tr. 166). 
Mr. Warnick testified that he was familiar with the land 
involved in this suit, he described in detail the types of vege-
tation on the land, and when asked whether he had an opinion 
as to the animal carrying capacity of the land to be condemned 
he said, CCI do" (Tr. 166-169). 
The law is well settled that a skilled or expert witness 
is one possessing, with regard to a particular subject, knowl-
edge or experience not acquired by the ordinary person. It has 
been held that although there is no exact standard for fixing 
the qualifications of such witness, ordinarii y, if he has had 
13 
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experience or tratntng which would enable him to form a 
judgment of a probative value, he is qualified to testify. 
32 C.J.S. pp. 94-96 
The determination of the qualification of a witness to 
state his opinion is for the trial court. 
Walkinhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P2d. 654 
Whether or not the qualification of a witness to state his 
opinion is sufficiently established is a matter resting largely 
in the discretion of the trial court. 
32 C.J.S. p. 99 
Graham v. Ogden Union Ry. etc. Co. 
79 Utah 1, 6 P 2d 465. 
In re Hanson's Estate. 
87 Utah 580, 52 P 2d 1103. 
Ordinarily the ruling of the trial court will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing of abuse. 
If the witness has some qualifications, he should be permitted 
to testify. 
In the case of In Re Hanson's Estate, supra, this Court 
said: 
((The matter of proper foundation or qualification 
of a \vitness to state a conclusion, an opinion or an 
impression, where the same is permissible in evidence, 
lies largely in the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Unless it appears that the evidence of underlying or 
(sense' facts is so inadequate as would compel this 
court to say as a 1natter of law that the trial court 
had erred in permitting a conclusion to be stated, 
the pern1itting of such conclusion to be stated will not 
be disturbed.'' 
14 
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,( 
II' 
In the case of Wray v. Fairfield Amusement Co., 126 
Conn. 221, lOA 2d 600, the court held that if any reasonable 
qualifications can be established for an expert witness, the 
objection goes to the weight rather than to the admissibility 
of the testimony. 
It has been held that perm1tttng testimony 1s not error 
if the witness has even slight qualifications. 
Lutz v. Allegheny County, 327 Pa. 587, 
195 A. 1 
Davis v. Southern Surety Co. 
302 Pa. 21, 153 A. 119 
Delaware etc. Co. v. Starrs, 59 Pa. 36 
Yorkshire Worsted Mills v. National Transit Co. 
28 Del Co. 402 
It is submitted that Mr. Warnick was qualified to testify 
and that the trial court properly ruled that the testimony was 
admissible. 
It is argued by the appellants that the jury's answer to 
special interrogatory number 3 to the effect ((that the highest 
and best use of the farm before taking was (crop farm with 
very limited number of livestock' leaves no doubt but that the 
testimony of Mr. Warnick on the subject of the carrying 
capacity of the 10.3 acres of land was accepted by the jury." 
This argument is obviously unsound in view of the testimony 
of Mr. Kiepe and Mr. Story mentioned above as to the very 
liinited area of good pasture, and the fact that the jury viewed 
the premises. The jury no doubt based its answers on all of 
the testimony in the record. We cannot assume otherwise. 
15 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 12 WAS CORRECT. 
The appellants complain that instruction to the jury No. 
12 was erroneous, misleading and prejudical. The instruction 
properly and specifically pointed out that the appellants were 
entitled to damages for diminution in value of the remaining 
lands, and improven:cnts. The same thought is expressed 
in instruction No. 5 as follows: 
<(2. The damages, if any, to the defendants' remain-
ing land and structures not taken, caused by the plaintiff 
by taking of the said 10.3 acres of land." 
See also instruction No. 8 (R. 54) which was given at the 
appellants' request. ·This latter instruction speciilcally men-
tioned the claim of a dairy farm operation. 
Upon analysis of instruction No. 12 is it clear that there 
is nothing therein which negatives in any manner the statement 
that the appellants were entitled to damages to the remaining 
land and buildings. 
Instruction No. 12 was necessary to point out the distinc-
tion between damages to remaining land and improvements, 
on the one hand, and damage to a dairy business, as such, on 
the other. Mrs. 1v1yrtle Nelson testified on direct examination 
that she and her husband had a dairy setup for Grade A milk, 
and that the farm had been operated for dairy purposes for 
2 5 years ( T r. 21) . Mr. Story based his testimony as to value 
on the land being suitable for, and theretofore used for a dairy 
business (Tr. 59). 
The distinction made in instruction No. 12 is valid. The 
landowner is undoubtedly entitled to diminution in value 
16 
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of rematntng land and buildings caused by the taking but 
not for damages to the dairy business, t(regardless of who 
conducted it on the land." 
In Just Con1pensation, by Kaltenback, page 23, it 1s 
stated: 
"A majority of the decisions deny the consideration 
of business damages in the absence of a specific statute 
authorizing their consideration." 
Under familiar rules the instructions must be considered 
as a whole, and when so considered it is clear that the jury 
was proper 1 y instructed that damages to remaining land and 
buildings could be considered. The form of verdict set out a 
space for the insertion of an amount for ''severance to property 
not taken" ( R. 69) . 
The appellants argue that the ninadequate severance 
award supports the appellants' contention that the jury was 
misled by instruction No. 12." Mr. Kiepe testified that sever-
ance damages amounted to $500.00. Mr. Story testified that 
they amounted to $17,645.40. The jury award under item 2, 
"Just compensation for severance damage to property not 
taken," was $1,847.00. The award was $1,347.00 higher than 
Mr. Kiepe's estimate, and it is entirely speculative as to what 
items were not included by the jury. However, it is certain 
that the award was for "damage to property not taken." It was 
well within the evidence. 
The testimony of Mr. Kiepe (Tr. 138, 139) is competent 
testimony that the appellants vvere out of the dairy business 
\vhen their lease of the bottom pasture land expired. This was 
before the condemnation case was filed. The jury could have 
17 
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limited the severance damages because of their belief that the 
expiration of the lease, and not the taking of the small acreage 
( 1 to 2 acres) of good pasture reduced the values. 
The appellants have failed to show either that the in-
struction was wrong, or if not, that it was prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment based on the answers to the special inter-
rogatories is supported by competent evidence. Mr. Kiepe's 
testimony would have supported a verdict as low as $3,540.00. 
It is not the province of this Court to speculate on how the 
jury arrived at the verdict and the judgment must be sustained 
as it was fairly within the evidence. The ruling of the trial 
court on the admissibility of Mr. W aJ;~ick' s testimony was 
correct, and the jury was properly instructed on matters of law. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment should be 
affirmed. 
E. J. SKEEN 
NEIL R. OLMSTEAD 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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